Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence by 张玲
学校编码：10384                                          密级                      




博  士  学  位  论  文 
                                           
投资者保护与公司治理: 
理论与证据 
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: 
Theory and Evidence 
 
张  玲    
 
指导教师姓名：陈汉文 教授 
专  业 名 称：会 计 学 
论文提交日期：2009 年 11 月 




























另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的

































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 


























-   




























                                                        








































-   
ABSTRACT 
The paper reexamines the issue about investor protection and corporate 
governance from the perspective of constitutional economics. At first we review 
research path of corporate governance and analyze the change of research framework 
from focusing on inducing and restricting managers to focusing on investor protection. 
And the paper summarizes academic and empirical research by LLSV et al. that law 
affects investor protection, corporate governance and financial market development. 
Thus when we further consider this question we wonder that where the country is 
provided with perfect basic institutional background, the law maybe is important; but 
where the country is in the transitional period, are legal rules important? How to 
ensure legal implementation in practice? We argue that whether investor legal 
protection mechanism is effective lies in an implementation mechanism in a broader 
sense, the constitutional system. This is more essential research way to understand 
investor protection and corporate governance. 
The paper introduces the rising and content of constitutional economics and 
constitutional thoughts of several main representative characters. Further, the paper 
lays stress on analyzing core points of constitutional economics and its significance to 
investor protection and corporate governance, and to transitional economy. Then we 
build “triplicate contract” model of investor protection in capital market which 
describes private contract between market participants, legal contract introducing 
legal rules, exchange regulation and accounting standard, and constitutional contract 
restricting administrative power. Then the paper reviews evolving path of economic 
thinking paradigm which shows to come back to classical tradition. 
Regarding China’s capital market the institutional background is characterized by 
state-owned banks, state-owned listed enterprises and government disturbance. 
Although China’s capital market has made great progress in protecting investor rights 
and corporate governance, practical difficulties still exist. The paper further examines 
the above issue. The paper points out that the way to reform is changing ownership 
structure, decreasing state ownership share and improving governance mechanism of 
listed companies. At the same time governance environment need be improved and 
intervention to capital market by administrative power should be decreased so that 
investor protection mechanism can function under the legal rule. 














controller’s characteristic and governance environment factors (including government 
disturbance and rule of law level) affect debt-covenant hypothesis. We argue that for 
state-owned bank and listed companies and administrative intervention to capital 
market, government controlled listed companies manifest different financing behavior 
from that of developed market economy. The results support our hypothesis that 
financial behavior is significantly different between non-government controlled and 
government controlled companies. The results are following: (1) Because debt 
constraints become soft to the government controlled companies, debt level has no 
significant effect on earnings management; debt level shows significant positive 
relation with EM only to non-government controlled companies; (2) For 
non-government controlled company, governance environment factors significantly 
affect positive relation between debt level and EM. In the area which is of higher 
marketization, or lower government intervention, or higher legal level, their positive 
relation is stronger. The policy meaning is advancing ownership reform so that debt 
financing can function by market mechanism and improving governance environment 
so as to reduce adverse choice risks of debt financing.  
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公司治理自 Jensen 和 Meckling（1976）的论文发表以来一直成为学术界持
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